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This essay examines the widespread concern in the 1860s and 1870s with ‘plutocracy’ – the 
political and social power of commercial wealth. It argues that we should not interpret either 
the pressure for parliamentary reform in the 1860s, or the consequences of the 1867 act, 
simply in terms of a contest between aristocracy and democracy. A third element, the 
growing influence of commercial men, was very widely noted before and after 1867, with 
differences of opinion about whether this would more favour the aristocracy or the 
democracy. Anxiety about plutocracy fuelled much of the pressure for reform, from both 
Cobdenite radicals and academic Liberals; this last group in particular was preoccupied with 
the possible parliamentary dominance of unimaginative and materialistic money men. On the 
other hand, opponents of reform were sceptical that a new electoral settlement would halt the 
rising influence of money. They were proved right, not least because the 1867 reforms 
increased the cost of winning a seat. The three parliaments elected in 1868, 1874, and 1880 
were dominated by commercial men, and there was even more alarm about plutocracy than 
before 1867. While this was interpreted in different ways by different groups, on the whole it 
benefited the Conservative Party and Conservative argument significantly more than it helped 
the Liberals. The Liberal Party found it difficult to agree on whether the political influence of 
commercial elites – a group with which it had once been identified – was now excessive, and 
what, if anything, could be done about it. This was to become a major problem for the left. 
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1 
In view of the great extension of the borough franchise, the 1867 Reform Act was clearly a 
significant step towards a more democratic politics. But it was also a leap in the dark: 
contemporaries had no idea what the effect of male household suffrage would be, or whether 
the two leading contemporary democracies, Napoleon III’s France and the United States, both 
unstable but for different reasons, would be any sort of guide. If other countries could not 
point a clear way forward, commentators could only base their predictions of the future on 
extrapolations of the present. Therefore, it is worth asking ourselves what was being said 
about the distribution of power in Britain in the 1860s and how reform might alter it. 
We tend to assume that debates about reform revolved around an antithesis between 
aristocracy and democracy, but this is a major oversimplification. By the 1860s, it was 
impossible to ignore the influence of commercial wealth, or what was sometimes called 
‘plutocracy’. This essay explores the ways in which the concept of plutocracy was discussed 
in the years before, and especially after, 1867. It was difficult to deny that commercial elites 
were very powerful in Britain. Were they beneficial for politics or not? 
Radicals of two sorts in particular emphasized the problem of plutocracy when 
proposing measures of reform in the 1860s. The first, including Richard Cobden, John Bright, 
and many artisanal leaders, maintained that commercial men had become seduced by the 
dominant aristocratic system and helped to prop it up, thus underlining the need for major 
democratisation. The second, a group of academic Liberals, saw the increasing influence of 
wealth in parliament as a specific problem which needed to be addressed by an anti-
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materialist alliance of ‘brains and numbers’.1 In the event, however, the 1867 act did not 
weaken the political influence of commercial men at all; numerically, they dominated the 
parliaments of 1868–85. Instead, it was the alternative alliance of ‘brains and numbers’ that 
failed to make headway. Consequently, in the 1870s, there was more concern about 
plutocracy than ever before, particularly in Liberal politics. Some attributed the political 
weight of money to its continuing and effective compact with aristocracy; others feared that it 
might, in fact, be the great beneficiary of democracy. Should radicals therefore seek to tackle 
the dominance of wealth head on? Or was it essentially a social reality – an issue for 
moralists, but not one on which a practical and effective politics could be based? Here was 
the beginning of a dilemma that has confronted, and on the whole divided, the left ever since.  
2 
By the 1850s and early 1860s, it seemed incontestable that Britain was the richest country the 
world had ever seen. Naturally, much of that wealth had found its way into the pockets of 
individuals. There were cotton, wool and iron masters who were able to dominate the affairs 
of their northern and midland towns; rail, engineering and shipbuilding entrepreneurs who 
had harnessed technological innovation to spectacular financial effect, most famously in the 
mania for shares in railway companies in the mid 1840s; rich merchants and bankers in 
London and elsewhere who had made fortunes trading with the whole world and increasingly 
supplied the capital for its infrastructural development; and a large class of investors keen to 
make money from domestic and international stocks on the markets.  
To many, the battles over the corn laws in the 1830s and 1840s had symbolised a 
class war between the old and the rising social elites. On one side, the landed interest was 
attacked by the commercial radicals of the big towns for its support for agricultural protection 
at the expense of cheap food for the masses, and more generally for the social power that 
rested on an excessive concentration of landownership. In response, the opponents of the 
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Anti-Corn Law League criticized the values of the commercial elites, claiming that they 
reduced all political questions to simple issues of profit and loss and that they recognized no 
social bonds beyond the ‘cash nexus’. These critics maintained that more alarming than the 
landed interest was a ‘monied interest’ or ‘plutocracy’ – concepts that were associated with 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Alphonse de Lamartine, and Alexis de Tocqueville, among modern 
writers, and Socrates and Plato among the ancients.2 In 1842, The Times claimed that a large 
proportion of ‘the whole manufacturing plutocracy’ backed the Anti-Corn Law League. In 
1845–6 the confluence of corn law repeal and the railway mania encouraged the protectionist 
tories, led by Lord George Bentinck, to criticize free-trading commercial men as a selfish and 
greedy class; his Morning Post obituary in 1848 hailed him as a gallant crusader against a 
‘sweeping tide of capitalism and money-loving’.3 In 1850, the Standard vowed that the 
Conservative Party would protect labourers from ‘the vulgar and ambitious rich’, and when 
Lord Derby formed a minority government in early 1852 it won the support of the (declining) 
Chartist paper, the Northern Star, because it seemed opposed to the ‘plutocracy’ and the 
Manchester school of commercial radicals.4  
This land-based tory critique of commercialism persisted in some quarters, but by the 
1860s it was more common to argue that the social and political interests of the landed and 
commercial elites had become rather similar. Many landowners had discovered coal and iron 
deposits on their estates or been enriched by the process of urban development on them. 
Landlords’ ability to profit from the industrial revolution led the Spectator to argue, in 1861, 
that the rise of the previously impoverished peerage to great wealth in the course of the 19th 
century was ‘the strangest change … ever recorded’.5 Moreover, it was natural for nouveaux 
riches capitalists, like their nabob predecessors, to seek the status and relative financial 
security of a landed estate. One commentator noted that ‘our territorial nobles, our squires, 
our rural landlords great and small, have become commercial potentates; our merchant 
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princes have become country gentlemen’.6 The repeal of the corn laws in 1846 showed that 
the middle classes had gained political influence since 1832: The Times, in 1854, thought 
plutocracy more powerful than aristocracy.7 However, it also appeared that most merchants 
were wealthy, stolid and socially aspirational, rather than fiery Manchester school radicals. 
Their anxiety to ape aristocratic mores became widely noted. For example, many of their sons 
bought their way into the army officer class, and the political attack on the system of 
purchasing officerships, from the mid 1850s, played heavily on the way in which it 
symbolised, and had been strengthened by, the arriviste snobbery of new wealth. Often 
oversimplified by historians into an attack on aristocracy, the campaign against army 
purchase was greatly facilitated by the emergence of this softer target.8 
Much of the criticism of plutocracy in the 1850s and 1860s focused on the deleterious 
effect of this new wealth on the morals of the traditional governing classes themselves. It 
seemed that uncultured money-worshippers concerned only with status were now powerful 
enough to infiltrate the polity and undermine its virtues. This was an updated version of a 
traditional complaint, first recorded in ancient Greece and more recently in relation to 18th-
century nabobs, that plutocracy would always ‘degrade’ aristocracy and convert ‘the 
government of the most worthy … into the government of the most wealthy’.9 It also owed a 
lot to alarm at the politics of the United States, where wealth was the only aristocracy and an 
alliance of ‘democracy and plutocracy’ seemed to have lowered morals.10 This was 
reinforced by the belief that French capitalists were propping up the artificial regime of 
Napoleon III, ‘the chief god of the Plutocracy in all commercial cities’. For the Atlas, looking 
back to the railway stock bubble symbolised by the entrepreneur, George Hudson, ‘Bonaparte 
worship and Hudson worship, its forerunner, are founded upon the same principles … King 
Hudson saw that as long as good dividends were paid, the virtuous public would ask few 
questions’.11  
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The clearest evidence of this commercial class desire for social acceptance was the 
number of men who sought a seat in parliament. One analysis (and all such analyses are 
imperfect estimates) indicates that the number of MPs with some industrial, commercial, or 
financial, interest rose from 248 to 545 (out of 658) between 1832 and 1865, as against 436 
with a landowning interest. Of these, the number involved in finance went up from 73 to 
165.12 John Stuart Mill excoriated these men: ‘the vulgar rich, to whom it is worth while to 
spend any amount of money for the sake of station in society’.13 Though some commercial 
MPs assiduously represented their own localities, others seemed to be brazenly buying their 
way in. As early as 1841, the Manchester Guardian and The Times were in agreement, from 
different party standpoints, that as only the richest and most unscrupulous seemed to be able 
to enter parliament, the ‘effect is to substitute a corrupt Plutocracy for a representative 
Government’.14 Twenty-seven MPs were unseated for corruption after the 1852 election, 
creating a national debate and the first serious attempt to legislate against corrupt practices.15 
The Daily News was clear after the 1857 election that the Commons was ‘for the rich’; in 
1864 the Spectator was sure that ‘electoral corruption … grows with the growth of wealth’. 
In 1867, the Westminster Review maintained that ‘for one rotten borough extinguished by the 
bill of 1832, three are now saleable to the highest bidder’.16 Some critics felt that, as a result, 
the commercial bias of parliament was evident, to the detriment of working men and 
consumers: the Scotsman, for example, mentioned railway companies escaping responsibility 
for breaches of engagement, and manufacturers’ resistance to protecting workers from 
accidents.17 Indeed, this was the beginning of widespread concern about the parliamentary 
power of a ‘railway interest’: Herbert Spencer noted, in 1855, that 81 MPs were railway 
company directors.18 The Westminster Review lamented that capitalists who sought seats had 
had technical training ‘rather than a liberal culture’; they saw every issue in terms of 
increasing ‘the market price of their property’. Constituencies seemed happy to elect local 
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‘nonentities’ who scattered money about cheerfully but were not interested in big issues and 
lacked the administrative ability to tackle national problems. 19 
Of course, very many voters and newspapers had no problem with the accumulation 
and display of wealth as prosperity reached new levels in the 1850s and 1860s. Palmerston’s 
supremacy was arguably built on this. Moreover, it was, and remains, extremely difficult to 
reach consensus on how much practical power the commercial classes had in mid-Victorian 
Britain. Karl Marx felt that key entrepreneurial values had triumphed, even if the bourgeoisie 
had to delegate the actual administration of the state to ‘aristocratic representatives’.20 There 
has been similar ambivalence about what representatives of commerce actually wanted to 
achieve in politics. Both questions are discussed in an excellent study by G.R. Searle.21 What 
we are concerned with here is the more limited issue of how anxieties about the influence of 
wealth in politics related to the reform debates of the 1860s and their aftermath.  
3 
Richard Cobden, John Bright and the other leaders of the Anti-Corn-Law League had been 
widely expected to attack more elements of aristocratic rule after their success in 1846, and to 
create a successful and self-confident urban middle-class politics. Their failure to win further 
victories, at the national level at least, therefore led to a mood of introspection. In the 1850s 
many of them blamed the urban commercial elites for imitating the aristocracy, rather than 
challenging it by taking up electoral reform and attacks on primogeniture. Cobden and Bright 
despaired of the ‘inveterate flunkeyism’ of the new rich and their apparent desire to make a 
bad imitation of the landed interest.22 Several radical papers (Lloyd’s Weekly, for example) 
now routinely talked of ‘the aristocracy and the plutocracy’ in the same breath, as 
monopolists of power and property. So did the Hungarian nationalist, Lajos Kossuth, in 1853, 
when explaining to a radical audience why the British establishment did not embrace his 
liberal foreign policy ideals.23 Thus Cobden and Bright continued to argue that the aristocracy 
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really still controlled British politics and that further reform was necessary to break that 
power and teach the commercial elites their social duty.24  
 The radical campaign for parliamentary reform which revived in the late 1850s was 
fuelled by this awareness of continuing propertied class dominance, combined with clear 
evidence of the political moderation and respectability of voteless artisans. Liberal MPs 
representing the big towns were particularly keen to argue that the franchise should be 
extended below the middle classes to dignified and responsible elite working men. 
Palmerston’s death in 1865 then removed the last obstacle to the campaign to rally the 
Liberal Party around the cause of further reform.  
The argument for extending the borough franchise beyond the £10 householder was 
an essential aspect of the case for reform, but it is best seen as a fundamental part of a broader 
concern with enhancing the quality of national leadership by improving the 
representativeness, tone, energy and accountability of parliament itself. Parliament needed to 
represent a proper variety and balance of classes and groups, so creating a truly national and 
integrated politics in ‘the public interest’, whereas the ‘influence of separate classes’ was now 
‘too strong’.25 In 1867, the Westminster Review remarked that it ‘is because [the plutocratic] 
class and the peers have legislated imperfectly for England that the call for Reform is so loud 
and general’.26 Indeed, the alliance of ‘all the territorial aristocracy and all the plutocracy in a 
firm and potent body’ was said to be the reason for the failure to tackle reform earlier.27  
The belief that reform must aim at improving the quality of parliamentary leadership 
was not a new one. The whig reformers of 1830–2 had also been largely preoccupied with 
strengthening the legitimacy of the governing classes by reinvigorating and moralising them. 
They had no doubt that the landed classes could, and should, continue to rule, but they felt 
that in the unreformed era they had become too complacent, sectional, lazy, and selfish, 
because of the lack of beneficial contact with public opinion. The 1832 Reform Act would 
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ensure, instead, that a propertied parliament and government fulfilled the whig model of 
identifying and paying attention to legitimate grievances and supplying intelligent answers to 
them. Moreover, some influential younger whigs with intellectual interests had the specific 
hope that a moralised government influenced by an active parliament would preside over a 
more dynamic legislative agenda. This would reflect the ‘spirit of the age’, specifically the 
latest ideas about political economy, pauperism, punishment and reformation, which the more 
widely read and politically thoughtful among MPs would articulate in their speeches. Thus 
culture and intellect, as well as property, were seen as important desiderata for at least a 
proportion of MPs. The systematising economic and social reforms of the 1830s, to the poor 
law, the prison system and education, helped to justify the view that the 1832 Reform Act had 
raised the intellectual level of the political elite in this way.28 
The debates of the 1860s reflected these concerns in an updated form. Parliament 
needed re-energising: MPs seemed apathetic; legislation had stalled; there was little interest 
in innovative political ideas or in what was now called ‘social science’. Many social 
problems were being completely neglected – ignorance, pauperism, chaotic public 
administration, lack of law reform, sanitation, Ireland.29 How could working men acquiesce 
in propertied rule unless ‘educated Englishmen … promptly and faithfully devote 
themselves’ to tackling ‘poverty, disease, and vice’? Moreover, there was always a danger 
that the lower classes might follow extra-parliamentary leaders. If demagogues playing on 
working-class emotions were not to gain power, there needed to be more intelligent direction 
of the nation from within parliament, and there had recently been little sign of this.  
The enormous increase of commercial and industrial wealth since 1832 made it 
outdated still to think in terms of a narrowly-landed governing class. The need for parliament 
and government to supply national leadership therefore focused attention all the more on the 
quality of the MPs from the commercial classes and the need to educate them into their 
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governing responsibilities.30 Would they be able to think and act with the breadth of 
understanding needed to deal with working men’s grievances? The question was the more 
urgent because of the widespread fear that the enlargement of the electorate in 1867 and the 
resulting costs of election contests would entrench their position. Those sceptical of the case 
for reform were particularly prone to argue that franchise extension would in fact benefit the 
rich. One concern was that the ‘dregs’ of the people who had ‘debauched’ morals and 
undisciplined minds, would be open to bribery. The Observer pointed out that a particular 
problem was the representation of the smaller towns, in some of which bribery was an 
entrenched practice, whereas larger ones tended to return public men of character and 
capacity. Thus some argued that the franchise should be increased in large towns but not in 
these smaller places, where there was little evidence of an informed and educated public.31 
Robert Lowe developed these fears in one of his notorious speeches against reform in 1866, 
warning that the future would involve ‘a plutocracy working upon a democracy’.32 Gladstone 
taunted him that to whip up fears of both democracy and plutocracy seemed inconsistent.33 
But Lowe was not alone in suggesting that, even if fears of bribery were downplayed, the 
increase in the urban electorate would add to the cost of election contests by necessitating 
more canvassing and legitimate electoral expenditure. The Times thought that, after reform, 
millionaires would be more successful than demagogues, while the Economist feared that 
there would be ‘literally no security against the plutocracy’.34 
Out of these concerns to improve the intellectual quality of parliamentary leadership 
and to check the political influence of the very rich, emerged a high-profile set of Liberal 
opinion-formers, who have been much studied but not usually placed in this particular 
context. These were the academic Liberals led by John Stuart Mill, who were mostly young 
university graduates, well-represented in journalism (for example, through John Morley of 
the Fortnightly Review) and literature (for example, Essays on Reform). They were clear that 
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commercial MPs were incapable of this intellectual leadership, since they lacked the rigorous 
education that would allow them to form their own cogent opinions, and would, instead, take 
them from the mob and from the vulgar press, except when swayed by their own selfish 
interests. Thus the future looked set to be a combination of capitalist self-interest and 
anonymous press campaigns – as French and American politics already suggested.35 The only 
way to prevent this was by a concerted attempt to elect more MPs from the intellectual elites 
– thus replicating the conditions of the 1830s and its rigorous social reforms. Christopher 
Harvie and others have provided an excellent insight into the academic Liberal thirst for a 
parliamentary career in the 1860s, but presented it as idiosyncratic.36 However, it was surely 
intended to replicate the influence of the Edinburgh Review men, Benthamites, and 
Philosophical Radicals on the legislation of the 1830s, and it followed logically from the 
critiques of the philistinism, introversion, and disorganisation, of more recent parliaments. 
Their central point was that academic Liberals needed to take a leadership role in politics if 
plutocracy was to be defeated.  
There were two specific reasons to believe that men of intellect and talent could gain 
seats and influence after a new reform act. The first was the activity of the Social Science 
Association (SSA), founded in 1857, which aimed to be a clearing house for ideas about 
society and its legislative needs. The SSA held high-profile meetings in the major towns of 
the country at which public-spirited men of property, academics and trade union 
representatives shared views and sought to reach solutions that transcended class interests.37 
Its role was explicitly to collect useful knowledge about social trends, a bank of expertise that 
would then help to mature public opinion on difficult social issues, preparing the way for 
legislation better than the complacent house of commons itself could do. Its president, 
symbolically, was Henry Brougham, the most famous survivor of the intellectual legislative 
radicalism of the 1830s. Its impact was at its zenith just before 1867, when most of its 
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supporters expected that its high-minded deliberations would sweep all before it once a 
reform act had been passed. Its influence would be felt, it was hoped, on long-standing social 
questions such as punishment, education, and medical reform, but also on more newly 
contentious ones like labour-capital relations. 
The second reason was the success of Mill in standing for election to parliament for 
the Westminster constituency as an independent in 1865, without needing to canvass, to pay 
for his own expenses, or to toe a party line. This was, in fact, a reversion to an old pattern of 
virtuous and outspoken radical tribunes being elected without incurring personal costs, but it 
had the added frisson of suggesting that one of the most populous constituencies could elect a 
man of intellect who openly told working-class voters that some of their class lied, that the 
secret ballot was a bad idea, and that his heterodox opinions on religious subjects were none 
of their business – as well as instructing them in his trademark moralised political economy. 
Mill and his protégé, Henry Fawcett, the young professor of political economy at Cambridge, 
who became MP for Brighton in 1865, promptly set themselves up as independent members 
opposed to interest in all its forms, especially ‘land and money’.38  
In 1867 and 1868, Mill and Fawcett spent a lot of parliamentary energy on the cause 
of reducing the cost of elections for candidates. Specifically, they sought to amend the 
Election Petitions and Corrupt Practices at Elections Bill of 1868, so as to prohibit payment 
of canvassers and to put official election expenses on the rates. Mill claimed that, without this 
latter change, the 1867 Reform Act would ‘deteriorate the representation’ and ‘bring us 
nearer to a plutocracy than we ever have been before’.39 Conversely, this proposal would 
allow more representatives of two groups to be elected. The first – probably their main 
concern in fact – was talented but impecunious young university-educated men; the second, 
and the most trumpeted rhetorically, was spokesmen for the working man, thus preventing 
the Commons from being a monopoly of the propertied classes. In any case, they claimed that 
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the university men could help to look after working-class interests themselves, as Mill, 
Fawcett, and Thomas Hughes, themselves did in demanding working-class representation on 
the royal commission on trade unions in 1867. As it happened, none of the three agreed with 
trade union leaders’ detailed legislative demands, and Mill doubtless hoped to be able to use 
his political clout to impose his own views on any future legislation, just as the political 
economists had done on the 1834 Poor Law. However, they were keen to advertise their 
awareness of working men’s concerns and their willingness to put them before parliament, 
demonstrating their common ground against an over-mighty capital interest.40 Similarly, John 
Morley wrote that, after reform was passed, ‘the contest will lie between brains and numbers 
on the one side, and wealth, rank, vested interest, possession in short, on the other’.41 Here 
was a vision in which men of mental quality would shape reformed politics by directing 
working-class enthusiasm to an intellectually-respectable and socially-consensual end. 
The progress of Mill and Fawcett’s battle to reduce election expenses in 1868 was 
widely followed by the press. After two votes were won in a thin House it seemed that the 
proposal might be accepted, though MPs on both sides of the House then ensured its 
rejection. This – described by the Spectator as the great blot on the reform settlement – 
capped a series of defeats for other proposals that had been floated, often by intellectual 
Liberals, in the hope of minimising the influence of money or ignorance in elections: the 
secret ballot, a less democratic borough franchise in smaller seats, a franchise weighted 
towards property or education, and proportional representation.42 Thus it quickly became 
apparent that the first election on the greatly extended franchise would be no breakthrough 
for either academic Liberals or representatives of working men. In February 1868, The Times 
noted radical alarm that, as things stood, the expense of canvassing the new electors would 
‘make government a matter of money’, and in June the Spectator, horrified by the likely cost 
of contests, feared a ‘monopoly to millionaires’.43 In August, the Manchester Guardian and 
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the Friend of India lamented the lack of working men standing as candidates and the likely 
failure of reform to improve the ethos of the Commons.44 The unusual length of the campaign 
– three months – increased the costs further. Very few working men’s representatives stood, 
and those who did were all defeated, in some cases by other Liberals, or, like George Odger, 
retired from the hustings because of the pointlessness of spending any more money on the 
cause. Hughes, self-proclaimed friend of the working man, was unable to defend his seat at 
Lambeth as a result of lavish spending by his opponents.45 Mill contributed to the election 
expenses of those candidates who supported the cause of working men, including the atheist, 
Charles Bradlaugh, but this was used against him in his election contest in the borough of 
Westminster. It perhaps contributed to his own spectacular defeat by the Conservative news 
magnate, W.H. Smith, who spent £8,900 on the contest (four times the costs of the two 
Liberal candidates), something about which Mill and his supporters assiduously 
complained.46 Fifteen young university men stood at the election but no more than four were 
successful, mostly in fact, through the electoral influence of their families.47  
4 
As it turned out, the composition of all three parliaments elected under the 1867 Reform Act 
suggested that the alliance of ‘brains and numbers’ had not worked, and that instead, 
commercial wealth had entrenched its dominance. The pattern was already set at the 1868 
election. In 1857, election expenses had exceeded £1,000 in 44 English boroughs and £5,000 
in three; now costs exceeded £5,000 in 22. The number of county constituencies where 
official election expenditure was at least £10,000 was 35 in 1868 as against eight in 1857. 
Total official costs across the country were £1,382,252.48 The number of nonconformist MPs 
doubled from 35 to 70, symbolising the increasing tendency of the big urban boroughs to 
return self-confident spokesmen for major ‘middle-class’ interests. Fawcett himself said of 
the new parliament: ‘intellectually it is inferior to the last, and wealthy, uneducated 
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manufacturers and merchants are more predominant than ever’.49 The broader story was the 
ever-increasing overlap of landed and commercial wealth. As the Daily News noted in 1869, 
the peers who mattered politically were mostly timid and cautious rich men, a plutocracy; the 
new earl of Derby was a prime example.50 Morley wondered how a parliament full of ‘golden 
mediocrities … in all the sleekness and complacency of commercial success’ could have any 
idea of what was wrong with England. Lloyd’s Weekly thought the zeal of the moneyed 
classes to buy the election showed that the gift of the suffrage ‘looks pretty, but it is 
useless’.51  
During the 1868–74 parliament, Fawcett continued to campaign for the transfer of 
election charges to the rates (as well as for various other causes dear to his heart, particularly 
the defence of the intellectual freedom of universities as guardians of meritocracy against ‘the 
danger of plutocracy’).52 His bill was only defeated by three votes in 1869 but was then taken 
up by government as part of its secret ballot proposals. This was a development that he later 
regretted as ministers manifestly lacked commitment to it, especially after the successful 
Conservative Party campaign against high local rate charges in 1872, which made the idea 
politically yet more awkward. In 1873, Fawcett took the proposal back under his own wing, 
claiming that working men’s leaders and the press were strongly behind him, but was still 
heavily defeated.53 In 1870, another radical MP, P.A. Taylor, introduced a motion to pay MPs 
a salary, in order to attract more men without means to stand for election. He claimed that the 
representation of working men was only one of his objects, the main one being to attract to 
parliament, men of no fortune but ‘fitted by intelligence and education’ for good service – 
‘men who have taken University honours’ but now found better prospects ‘working at the 
diggings of Ballarat or California’. Gladstone countered that there was an oversupply of 
leisured men keen to serve the public for free, and the division was lost 24 to 211.54 The 
secret ballot was introduced in 1872, but, whatever its other merits (denied by Mill and 
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minimised by Fawcett), it did not make elections cheaper. As a result, Reynolds’s Weekly did 
not believe that it would aid the representation of working men, while after the 1874 election, 
the academic Liberal, George Brodrick, claimed that it had done little to undermine coercion 
and corruption.55 
At any rate, it was generally agreed that ‘the House of 1874 is even richer than the 
House of 1868’, with the added demerit of a Conservative majority. Frederic Harrison 
imagined the new Commons as such a store of capital that it would soon be ‘floated’ by a 
company broker. Goldwin Smith lamented ‘the reduction of a once illustrious assembly to a 
mass of … soap-boilers’. A few years into its tenure, W.R. Greg noted the paradox that ‘the 
least noble-minded and the worst-mannered House of Commons we have known has been the 
one chosen by the most popular and broad-based electorate’.56 In a famous assault on modern 
Britain in 1874, Greg had already indicated his concern that parliament was now dominated 
by men of ‘rank and wealth’ to the exclusion of youthful talent and administrative ability.57 
Tellingly, Gladstone’s main criticism of this article was that he had not criticized the threat of 
‘plutocracy’ enough. This became one of Gladstone’s bêtes noires throughout the 1870s: in 
1877 he warned that there was a danger of ‘both a gerontocracy and a ploutocracy [sic]’ 
because of the number of retired merchants who aspired to the status of MP for ‘social 
advancement’, but who were too old and incapable to be trained up for service to the state in 
the way that promising young executive politicians of his own generation had been. Instead, 
able young dons went off to corrupt themselves and the nation by writing anonymously and 
irresponsibly for the newspapers. Gladstone now took up the call for reduction of expense of 
elections, though he, too, was more concerned about getting university men into parliament 
than working men, whom he claimed loved inequality and the social status quo so much that 
they were ‘either unable or unwilling to combine even to the moderate and reasonable extent 
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which would have sufficed to place half-a-dozen or a dozen of themselves in the popular 
chamber’.58 
The Liberal victory at the 1880 election cheered up reformers, but the plutocratic tone 
of the Commons was noted to be just as powerful as before.59 Official election costs had risen 
further to £1,736,781; the average per candidate was over £3,000 in counties and over £1,000 
in boroughs, and total expenses exceeded £5,000 in 28 English boroughs. The number of 
MPs with industrial, commercial or financial interests had increased even more, from 528 in 
1868 to 621 (as against only 330 with landowning interests). Of these, 215 had interests in 
finance, while the railway interest was now experienced and organised enough to make its 
presence felt on select committees.60 A contemporary analysis which assigned only one 
interest to each MP reckoned 269 primarily commercial members against 125 landowners 
and 37 non-legal professional men.61 On the other hand, the SSA had for many years been 
losing significance – it was broken up in 1886 – while academic Liberals had ceased to 
function as a group (Fawcett was now a junior minister).62 There seemed no option for 
radicals but further parliamentary reform. 
5 
In the first chapter of Middlemarch (1872), George Eliot transported her readers back to the 
days before provincial life was transformed materially by what she ironically called the 
‘gorgeous plutocracy’ of the present day.63 Eliot was not alone in labelling her age in this 
way. In 1875, the Nation remarked that ‘one of the most salient features of the age in which 
we live is its tendency to throw power more and more into the hands of moneyed men’. In 
June of the same year, Alfred Austin blamed English passivity in foreign affairs since the 
Crimean War on a national obsession with ‘wealth’ and ‘comfort’.64 Of course, it is not 
unusual to find writers and journalists lamenting a social obsession with money and 
materialism: in any society as rich as mid-Victorian Britain one could find similar examples. 
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None the less, it is clear that there was an increasing interest in using the term ‘plutocracy’ in 
the years immediately after 1867.65 It is equally clear that the sheer number and variety of 
commercial MPs in parliament allowed that concern to take different forms. Radicals and 
academic Liberals continued to worry about the conservative tendencies and social 
selfishness of the urban commercial elites, while Conservatives had a similar fear about the 
unreliability of those elites, but expressed it differently, focusing on the unwillingness of 
northern and midland radicals to pay their taxes for the support of national institutions. To put 
it another way, there was a continuing radical concern about the tendency of plutocracy to 
uphold aristocracy, but also an alarm that Lowe might have been right and that plutocracy 
could succeed in manipulating the new democracy. 
If we explore further the various political contexts in which plutocratic influence was 
discussed in the 1870s, we can see that the effect was to pose awkward questions for Liberals 
about the future direction of radicalism, and in some degree to help the revival of the 
Conservative Party. 
It was natural that, after 1870, a strand of radicalism would develop which saw 
aristocracy and plutocracy as united forces of privilege to be attacked. Joseph Chamberlain 
said so at Sheffield just before the 1874 election, as did the academic Liberal, Goldwin 
Smith, repeatedly, from his exile in the more congenial United States.66 This argument 
became plausible at the point when the Gladstone government’s ballot, licensing and 
abolition of purchase bills were all obstructed in the Lords or Commons in 1871, apparently 
by propertied, military, and brewing, vested interests. In 1872, Goldwin Smith called the 
Lords the ‘bond and cement of oligarchy’, while for the Daily News it represented the ‘vulgar 
plutocracy’.67 This was the moment at which Gladstone became convinced that vested 
interests were threatening his programme, and it was at Whitby after the session that he made 
his first public attack on the plutocracy, alleging that ‘wealth was all-powerful’ in London, as 
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shown by the clubland opposition to the abolition of army purchase.68 Apparent corruption 
and money-worship made other radical targets easier to attack as well: when nonconformists 
mounted their campaign for church disestablishment in 1876–7, several of them used the 
Church’s materialism and good relations with wealthy elites as evidence that it was not a 
proper spiritual body.69  
However anything approaching overt class-based radicalism was likely to scare a lot 
of powerful individuals, which accounts for the euphemistic gingerliness with which Liberals 
toyed with it. There seemed little electoral enthusiasm for it. Chamberlain was defeated in 
Sheffield and it was nearly another decade before even he properly took up the language of 
class. At this point, Gladstone’s critique of vested interests rarely ventured beyond 
indignation that their selfishness was damaging the efficiency of national institutions and 
increasing the burdens on the taxpayer. Most Liberal MPs would never mobilise for an attack 
on wealth.  
Even the army issue demonstrated the limits to the Liberals’ attack on plutocracy and, 
indeed, showed their vulnerability to the charge of being a plutocratic party themselves. 
Probably the main reason for the loss of popular confidence in the Gladstone government in 
1871 was its inadequate response to the international crisis and invasion scare resulting from 
the Franco-Prussian war. It was the sense that the country was not prepared for the new and 
more dangerous state of Europe, and in particular, that it had neglected its army and navy, 
that damaged confidence in the government’s judgment, weakened Gladstone’s case for 
further financial economy, and made the abolition of purchase look at best an insufficient 
reform and at worst a distraction. The most popular critique of government defence policy in 
1871 was G.T. Chesney’s much-reprinted invasion scare story, The Battle of Dorking, which 
relied on the traditional tory jibe at the cost-cutting obsessions of Manchester school 
radicalism to explain the weakness of the army in the face of the new German threat. In the 
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story, the German army was able to invade Britain – and steal its foreign markets, the most 
reliable elements of national wealth in the minds of complacent commercial men – because of 
the unwillingness of these same men, now so dominant, to pay their taxes for an army which 
they thought the country no longer needed.70 Here was the return of the old tory critique of 
the commercial selfishness of the Liberal plutocracy of the northern and midland towns. As 
the Saturday Review said in its waspish critique of Gladstone’s speech at Whitby, wealth was 
all-powerful, not just in London, but in Leeds and Manchester as well, which was why 
defence spending had been inadequate.71 
To the extent that there was political mileage in complaints about the selfishness of a 
commercial parliament in 1870–4, tories were likely to reap most of the benefit, since that 
parliament was, after all, dominated by Liberal MPs. Trade unionists and their supporters 
protested against the Criminal Law Amendment Act outlawing picketing, which seemed to 
have been imposed by the ‘short-sighted clique of capitalists to whom Mr Gladstone has 
truckled on these matters’.72 In 1873, the satirical magazine, Fun, attacked the parliamentary 
shipowners’ interest for blocking Plimsoll’s campaign to improve the safety of ships. 
Radicals like Frederic Harrison and Chamberlain were annoyed by Gladstone’s pledge to 
abolish income tax in 1874, ‘simply an appeal to the selfishness of the middle classes’ which 
left the working man to shoulder more of the tax burden.73 There was significant opposition 
in various neighbourhoods to the Liberals’ Endowed Schools Act of 1869, based on 
indignation that schools which had offered free education now favoured parents who were 
able to afford fees.74 Disraeli’s nods to the cause of sanitary reform at Manchester in 1872 
may have been vapid and bland but they were not without political point. Disraeli could be 
criticized for many things, but at this point, worship of capitalism was not usually one of 
them; the Daily News remarked that he was as far from ‘bourgeois … Toryism … as can 
possibly be’. When he became prime minister in 1868, one newspaper opined that he had the 
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contempt that men of letters felt for the plutocracy, another that neither landed nor 
commercial elites had been able to keep him down.75 His support for the monarchy against 
republicanism in 1872 was welcomed by the Welshman because the ‘hereditary idea is the 
only idea which at the moment tempers the plutocracy, and restrains [the] mad debauch of 
prodigality’.76  
On the whole, however, the power of wealth was too widespread to make it possible 
for either political party to own the issue. The most famous and lengthy critique of money-
worship at this time was Anthony Trollope’s 100-chapter novel, The Way we Live Now, 
serialised in 1873–4 and published in book form in 1875, which charted its insidious reach 
into all aspects of national, and indeed, international, life. Trollope pointedly showed that the 
acme of the villain Melmotte’s ambition is still to enter parliament, not because he wishes to 
achieve anything but simply because that is how rich men advertise their social power. Thus 
he gets himself elected, by flashing his money and name at all classes – significantly for 
Westminster, the seat that had just preferred a businessman to Mill. Whenever he needs to 
assert to himself and to others that he has conquered Britain, he goes to sit in the Commons, 
and, indeed, dishonours it by a drunken performance on the day that he is ruined. Trollope’s 
sympathies throughout the novel were clearly with the old-fashioned gentry whose values 
were being undermined by materialism. In the same way, J.A. Froude, in 1876, argued that 
the emergence of a powerful, but vulgar, plutocracy had increased understanding of, and 
respect for, the public spirit of the landed gentry class.77 Most of those who held this view 
(though not Trollope himself) were likely to support the Conservative Party as the party of 
the gentry.78  
However, it must also be pointed out that The Way we Live Now was not particularly 
successful. How bothered was public opinion about British materialism? For all the criticism 
of plutocrats, especially from the liberal intelligentsia, there were also lots of people who had 
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no problems with the Commons reflecting the social reality of ‘the predominance of wealth’ 
over poverty.79 The Spectator told off Goldwin Smith for thinking that the inequality-loving 
British people could be attracted by continental-style radicalism.80 Nor was the complacency 
of parliament necessarily seen as a problem. Indeed the parliamentary sketch-writer, Henry 
Lucy, waxed lyrical in 1874 about ‘the silent member’ who was ‘either the scion of some 
ennobled race or a successful tradesman or merchant’, who never spoke in debates but did his 
duty by voting intelligently, and whose taciturn common sense allowed parliament to reach a 
‘collective wisdom’ nearer perfection than any other representative assembly on earth.81  
The feelings of the wealthy themselves were also politically important. Landowners 
and commercial men now clearly had many interests in common, and their natural political 
stance was to protect their property and resist Liberal radicalism and the trends towards 
democracy. In the second edition of his English Constitution, published in 1872, Walter 
Bagehot argued that though the spirit of the house of commons was now ‘plutocratic, not 
aristocratic’, this was not a threat to landowners. If the house of lords would only flatter the 
commercial elites and encourage their natural worship of rank, it would strengthen the 
alliance between aristocracy and plutocracy necessary in order to preserve the position of 
both against the ‘rule of uneducated numbers’, the ‘ignorant multitude’. 82 There were enough 
apparitions of future radical priorities to cause alarm to both classes: communism in France, 
republican agitation in Britain, a government attacking a church establishment in order to 
appease Irish disaffection. This, Conservatives argued, should encourage commercial men to 
respect institutions more than they had done in the past.83 Frederic Harrison noted after the 
1874 election, that ‘the rich trading-class and the comfortable middle-class’ had turned tory, 
and that the Conservative Party was now ‘just as much bourgeois, industrial and practical as 
Liberalism’. Goldwin Smith in 1872 similarly discerned that it had become ‘simply the party 
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of the rich’. Brodrick thought it inevitable that a self-made man of £5,000 a year ‘of sordid 
nature and imperfect education’ would gravitate to Conservatism.84  
Moralists could criticize the tendency of men of wealth to make alliances to shore up 
their position, but it was much less clear whether politicians could, or should, commit to 
doing much about it. This was a particular problem for Liberals, given that so many of them 
had hoped that 1867 would mark the beginning of a new politics integrating working men. 
No representatives of working men were elected in 1868 and only two miners’ agents in 
1874.85 Few academic Liberals continued the experiment of Mill and Fawcett in trying to 
unite ‘brains and numbers’. The manifest concern about potential democratic pressures from 
outside the House contributed to a Conservative reaction and victory in 1874, even without 
much evidence of such pressures. 
The sense that the country’s elites had come together to resist radicalism raised 
important questions for Liberals about their party’s future direction. I have argued elsewhere 
that 1868–74 saw the end of an old, and often effective, radical tradition based on the cry of 
‘old corruption’ and organised around complaints at the control of the institutions of state by 
vested interests and the associated high expenditure and taxation. The power of this argument 
declined because all the egregious examples of such institutional bias had been removed, 
while the extension of the franchise made it untenable to argue that ordinary people had no 
redress against minority domination of the state. Thus there was no mileage in further radical 
attacks on the already very low levels of income tax, or the monarchy or army, both of which 
now became symbols of patriotism.86 The question then was how radicalism should redefine 
itself. Some predictably wanted to attack the Church establishment, the house of lords or 
landed primogeniture, but these proposals were too radical for most MPs. An attack on 
commercial wealth would have been even more unpalatable. Divisions between Liberal 
capitalists and trade unionists meant that settling the grievance about picketing was left to the 
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incoming Disraeli government. The Liberal leadership spent the next decade advocating 
various displacement causes that tried to avoid as far as possible, raising tensions between the 
urban classes: this was the politics of Bulgaria, Midlothian, county reform, and Ireland. None 
the less, Gladstone’s anger at the obstructive tendencies of powerful ‘vested interests’ 
eventually led him to place himself with the ‘masses against the classes’ in 1886, an exciting 
moment for some but a step too far for many propertied Liberals.87 
In 1874–80, the most important development in the Liberal Party was its attempt to 
criticize parliament’s social complacency in another way: by supporting various attempts to 
move the centre of politics away from it. The three most significant political innovations of 
the late 1870s were the Bulgarian Agitation (1876), the formation of the National Liberal 
Federation (NLF) (1877) and the emergence of the Irish National Land League (1879). All 
were founded on the belief that the parliament of 1874 did not speak for the people – as, 
indeed, was the new campaign for franchise extension in the county seats that had given 
Disraeli victory on a minority of the vote. Even Lowe attacked parliament’s ‘lavish 
expenditure of public money … studious deference to all powerful interests’ and neglect of 
awkward questions which ‘do not pay’, blaming this on the dominance of the ‘old and rich’.88 
Chamberlain intended the NLF to be a more representative national parliament, in which 
activists from all classes would debate policy issues. Brodrick later traced a connection 
between the Bulgarian Agitation’s attempt to ‘drown the voice of parliament’ and the 
decision of the Parnellites to found their nationalist campaign on the same principle: he felt 
that reverence for parliament was declining.89 The Conservative reaction of the 1870s, like its 
Peelite predecessor of 1837–41, thus mobilised those elements on the left that believed, like 
the middle-class activists who had been so vocal on economic, religious and constitutional 
issues in 1838–46, that parliamentary virtue would be secured only by ‘pressure from 
without’.  
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In fact this development turned out to be as short-lived as the previous version; it was 
difficult to sustain a high degree of populist enthusiasm for radical political campaigns. In the 
late 19th century, no one took the place of Bright as a tribune capable of connecting voters to 
the world of parliament over many years and on a series of engaging issues. Instead, the 
Liberal Party became prone to faddism, with different groups mobilising for diverse causes, 
all relatively unpopular. Political leaders in both parties became willing to court a wider 
public through regular speeches on ‘the platform’ and other media appearances. Engagement 
with the electorate became more systematic and parliament was forced to accept that it was 
only one element of the process through which national politics was conducted. This led to a 
new emphasis on the role of ‘public opinion’. But it was not a particularly radical 
development; Conservative leaders turned out to be more than able to hold their own in the 
public gaze.90  
Meanwhile in parliament itself the two problems about which academic Liberals and 
other critics complained in the mid 1860s – the lack of seats available for young men of 
ability but no wealth, and the lack of a force that could direct policy and organise MPs out of 
their complacency – were eventually solved, more or less, and by the same process: the 
growth of more organised and professional parties able to influence constituency selections 
and to whip MPs into line. It is important to remember, though, that this development did not 
seem particularly likely in 1867, and that it took at least 20, and arguably nearer 40 more 
years, to come to pass.  
6 
It would be difficult to study British politics in the ten years after 1867 and conclude that it 
was dominated either by democratic pressures or by aristocratic influence. On the other hand, 
a decent case could be made for the prevailing power of money, though this was conceived 
differently by different groups. An old tory critique of the undue weight of narrow-minded 
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capitalists was revived by the defence scare of 1871 and also by the nonconformist 
campaigns of the 1870s on church and education matters, which built on a puritan mentality 
that had already been famously satirised by Matthew Arnold in 1869, and on the increased 
legitimacy given to dissenting leaders by the extension of the borough franchise. Radicals, on 
the other hand, intensified their concern that industrial elites were selling out socially and 
politically to the old elites, seduced by snobbery, materialism and London clubland values. 
Mill and Fawcett tried unsuccessfully to build a sturdy bridge capable of linking the concerns 
of academics and working men in a crusade against plutocratic dominance, while the failed 
Liberal parliamentary candidate, Anthony Trollope, could only campaign ineffectively 
against the same phenomenon in literary form. Arguably, the main effect of all these radical 
and Liberal attacks on the commercial elites was to encourage many of them to join forces 
with the landed classes under the umbrella of the Conservative Party, a trend to which its 
opponents seemed to have no effective response. The year 1867 seems a major step in 
retrospect, and of course, it eventually brought about significant changes as well as fears of 
change. None the less, its short-term social consequences were much less dramatic: in the 
dozen years after the act, the power of wealth and property seemed as strong as ever. It is 
perhaps worth venturing the conclusion that, notwithstanding all the emphasis placed by 
historians on the moralistic reformers of the 1860s, British social elites were more than a 
match for them. 
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